imaginable body (tajsim, taswfr). Other writers attributed similar errors to the hashwiyya (vulgar). The hadith folk complained that the Murji'a called them shukkak (doubters) for saying, "I am a believer, God willing," while the Qadariyya called them mujbira or jabriyya for upholding divine predestination.14 To use any of these terms for the hadith folk would mean taking sides as much as it would mean calling them ahl al-sunna, which is needless for modern scholars.
There were hadith folk in all the great centers of Islam. The traditionalist leader of Nishapur wrote to traditionalist leaders in Ray and Baghdad to warn them against Dawud al-Zahiri, who alleged that the Qur'an was muhdath (i.e., there had been a time that the Qur'an was not).'" Hadith folk in Baghdad warned those of Nishapur against the famous traditionist Bukhari, whom they then drove from the city for suggesting one's pronunciation of the Qur'an was created.'6 But the center about which we are best informed is certainly Baghdad, where the hadith folk looked above all to Ahmad ibn Hanbal as their imam. The material for this study will come mainly from Baghdad in the late 9th century. For the piety of the hadith folk, it will often draw on quotations of Ahmad himself. It is difficult to say how precisely these quotations record Ahmad's own views. A cursory reading of a book such as Kitab al-Wara' ("the book of carefulness," meaning care to avoid everything possibly illicit) shows that it was assembled by others, even if Ahmad's name is on the title page. As products of a school rather than of an individual author, however, such books are all the more useful in characterizing the piety of a school. Indeed, it arguably would be more difficult to characterize the piety of Ahmad himself than that of the party around him.
Two salient features of traditionalist piety were unremitting seriousness and an overwhelmingly moralistic conception of the Islamic community. Hostility to specialization (also, perhaps, to political involvement) distinguished traditionalists from Mu'-tazili ascetics and early Sufis. Their unremitting seriousness and a certain intellectual austerity distinguished theirs from the asceticism (zuhd) popular in high literary circles. However, the different parties shared enough to undergird a united Sunni community in later centuries. This is not to say that all hadith folk refused to laugh. Some did laugh, and all related hadith reports by which the Prophet would laugh until his molars showed (although usually with the gloss that his laughing was really smiling).26 If all had refused to laugh, those who refused to would not have been noteworthy. However, it does show that refusal to laugh was admired, while it is rare for the biography of a traditionalist to observe that he liked to joke and laugh.27
The point of not laughing was mainly, I think, that one should restrict one's attention to solemn, religious matters. Remembered William James's definition of "divine" as "such a primal reality as the individual feels impelled to respond to solemnly and gravely, and neither by a curse nor a jest."28 Jurisprudents of all tendencies debated whether laughter during one's ritual ablutions or prayer would invalidate them.29 These traditionalists simply extended the ban on laughter to the rest of everyday living. Hodgson speaks of "devotion to the One expressed in the Qur'an, and to its moral demands," which nothing should be allowed to weaken. 30 Single-minded devotion manifested itself in many ways-for example, in traditionalists' hostility to chess. Ahmad's close follower Abu Bakr al-Marrudhi (d. 888) related the hadith report from the Prophet, "He who plays chess is accursed, and whoever watches them is like the eater of pork."31 Other hadith reports had the Prophet calling on God to curse whoever played chess or reporting that God already had cursed them.32 What did they have against chess? Jurisprudents commonly objected that chess might be the subject of betting.33 Some Kufan traditionists considered chess to be involved with Magianism.34 The qadi Abu Yusuf (d. 798) was said to have disallowed the testimony of one who had bet on chess or let it distract him from his prayers.35 (Hanafiyya such as Abu Yusuf were not hadith folk, of course, and stories of their piety show mixed attraction and repulsion. Take, for example, two accounts from 11th-century sources. According to the first account, Abu Hanifa was never seen laughing, merely smiling; according to the second, Abu Hanifa used to joke a great deal.36) Gambling was forbidden, but fear that the chess player would forget his prayers agrees with hostility to other diversions, such as playing musical instruments The community as conceived by the hadith folk seems to have flowed mainly not from the exigencies of life in the desert but from a stress on obedience to a transcendent God as opposed to communion with an immanent God-that is, in Max Weber's terms of ideal types, an ascetic (moralistic) orientation rather than a mystical one.47 For example, it has most of the earmarks of a contractual community, whose membership is voluntary and within which there is substantial equality. Voluntary membership and equality flow from a stress on morality, which continually makes the individual choose to do one thing and not another; it also tends to demand the same choices from all individuals. By contrast, mystics tend toward an organic conception of community, accepting hierarchy and specialization, for some will be found closer to God than others. Perhaps, to give Hodgson his due, it was indeed the exigencies of commercial life in cities that pushed the hadith folk in the direction of morality rather than mysticism-and he does speak of "the Shari'ah-minded guardians of the single godly moralistic community."48
The ascetical (moralistic) character of the hadith folk's conception of community comes out clearly in their reaction to tawakkul, the endeavor to live entirely by what came without one's seeking it. Ahmad said, "Tawakkul is good; however, a man must not be a charge on others. He should work, in order that he make himself and his family independent."49 Weber observes that the mystic depends on others' remaining in the world for him to leave it, provoking the ascetic's indignation. Weber was presumably thinking of early Protestant polemics against monasticism, but one could not find a clearer illustration than Ahmad's wariness of tawakkul. Likewise, indeed, the examples of concern for the community quoted earlier from some who resisted at the Inquisition stress individual choice: it is not that the community must rise or fall as a body, but that Ahmad, Bakkar, and Buwayti were setting examples for other individuals to follow.
Concern about maintaining community can look like hostility to excellence. Hodgson says of the shari'a as it was elaborated in early 'Abbasi times: A major concern was evidently to keep ideal decorum within everyone's range. As Ahmad complained, having heard of someone's saying that worry about one's provision for the morrow would be counted a sin, "Who is so strong as this?"56 Against Hodgson, I tend to doubt whether the point was to preserve the cultural homogeneity of ideal Medina. How did they know it was homogeneous? More important, what made that feature so attractive to them? I would say the point was rather to respect the nature of moral demands. A moral demand is necessarily the same for everyone, in every place, at every time. For example, adultery is not sometimes forbidden and sometimes allowed but always forbidden; supporting one's family is not sometimes required and sometimes omissible but always required. If someone did something not everyone might do, such as never worrying about his provisions for the morrow, it was evidently not in response to a moral demand from God. It rather had the nature of a stunt: "look what I can do." As such, it necessarily appeared to the hadith folk as frivolity, a reprehensible distraction from the performance of universal religious duties. Ibn Kathir suggests as much in his explanation of Ahmad's and Abu Zur'a alRazi's disapproval of Muhasibi and his fellow proto-Sufis: "their talk of austerity ... and far-reaching, minute self-observation was something concerning which no command had come."57 More positively, one might see traditionalist hostility to special callings as concern about promoting well-roundedness. Someone told Ahmad that a man might work at Qur'anic recitation, frequent the mosque, or seek hadith, but not two of these at once. Ahmad said it was incumbent on him both to frequent the mosque and to seek hadith.58
It is something of a puzzle, then, why it was not easy to be expelled from the community as conceived by the hadith folk and why their community did not split into competing sects. These, too, are regular features of the religious community whose basis is moral, not mystical. To the moralist, unpunished adultery, for example, seems a standing insult to God, and the adulterer has removed himself from the community. The mystic, by contrast, tends to see past the individual's adultery to, perhaps, the inner light.59 The easy answer must be that every piety has both ascetic (moralistic) and mystical elements. A mystical element of traditionalist piety is its refusal to expel people from the community for wrong actions, sins. More subtly, one might also say that the hadith folk managed to rank Muslims by the quality of their obedience (as Hodgson says, "the only true difference among the faithful was in degree of piety"), and so they managed to accept a degree of hierarchy by which it was not necessary to expel those who would not follow the rules, only to look condescendingly down on them. Finally, a combination of hierarchy with stress on individual obedience suggests that obedience to God, for the hadith folk, had a pronouncedly ritual character. 60 The law was about following everywhere a revealed pattern. Such seems to be, indeed, the precise sense of sharica, although the word is as rare in the writings of 9th-century hadith folk as elsewhere.61 Traditionalist resentment of rationalistic theology would then have had to do with its threat to break loose from the received pattern; likewise, indeed, traditionalist suspicion of Sufism, and to a degree adab. Not only was Ahmad hostile to crucially important precursors of the Sufis; he also rejected principal Sufi practices. He rejected roaming from place to place, worshiping: "Siyaha has nothing to do with Islam."68 Someone told Ahmad of a group that met to pray, recite the Qur'an, and recollect God (yadhkurana Allah). Ahmad responded that it was enough to read from the (public) bound copy, to recollect God to oneself, and to seek hadith. Meeting in public for these purposes was an innovation to be condemned.69 On the whole, the Sufism of Junayd, with its regular meetings for the exchange of definitions, must have pleased him very little.
As for the two salient features of traditionalist piety pointed out earlier-seriousness and a contractual, moralistic conception of community-the hadith folk were at odds with the Sufis. As for seriousness, Junayd said, "I would rather be kept company by a good-natured debauchee than an ill-natured ascetic."'o I do not recall reading about a Sufi who was never seen laughing or smiling. As for the contractual community, mystics tend toward an organic conception of community, accepting hierarchy and specialization. Junayd and his comrades clearly specialized to a greater degree than the hadith folk allowed. Although they still paid some attention to Qur'anic recitation and hadith, for example, they clearly devoted most of their time to other disciplines, and they sometimes expressly rejected the collection of hadith when it came into conflict with the demands of Sufi devotion.71 Junayd's argument for mystics to respect less enlightened ascetics clearly demonstrates a hierarchical notion of the Islamic community. 72 However, it is clear that the classical Sufis were closer to the hadith folk than some of their predecessors had been. In particular, I think of Mu'tazili ascetics and the Karramiyya, who strongly disagreed with the hadith folk concerning kasb (gain). The Mu'tazila are most famous for their rationalistic theology, but they evidently began as an ascetic movement, the name signifying withdrawal from sinful society.73 They were only gradually distinguished from the general ascetic tradition in the late 8th century, scarcely any earlier than the hadith folk themselves were distinguished from the general religious movement. 
